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EMINENT DOMAIN AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: A NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW IN 
DISCRIMINATION CASES 
Catherine E. Beideman* 
Abstract: Government takings of private land for public purposes are 
permitted by the United States Constitution. Recently, more takings 
have occurred that largely benefit private individuals rather than the 
general public. The land taken for private benefit has primarily been 
that of low-income and minority individuals. Similarly, toxic waste sites 
are most often placed in low-income and minority neighborhoods. The 
modern environmental justice movement helps to shed light on why 
low-income and minority property owners are targeted in this way. The 
U.S. Supreme Court should adjust its analysis of both takings cases and 
environmental justice cases to account for the inability of the victims of 
these government actions to prove discriminatory intent. Without this 
adjustment, the blatant disparate impact of these decisions will continue 
to disproportionately burden low income and minority individuals. 
Introduction 
 In recent years, citizen groups have made numerous attempts to 
resist efforts of local and state governments to take private property for 
public use.1 Each of these cases involves a similar pattern: government 
condemns land for public use, and homeowners subsequently claim 
that the attested public use is not justifiable or that the compensation 
offered as remittance for their loss is not sufficient.2 An equally impor-
tant—although less frequently acknowledged—similarity between these 
eminent domain cases is that the condemned land is typically owned by 
low-income or minority citizens who live in economically depressed ar-
eas,3 while the “public use” to which the land is dedicated often benefits 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2006–07. 
1 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 2655 
(2005); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981); 
Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86 (N.J. 2002). 
2 See Kelo, 843 A.2d 500; County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004); 
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455; James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on 
Eminent Domain, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1277, 1278 (1985). 
3 See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 510; Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
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middle or high-income citizens and/or politically favored groups or 
corporations.4 
 Taking from the poor to give to the rich is not a new issue in envi-
ronmental law, and the environmental justice movement was founded 
in part to oppose this trend.5 For many years, toxic waste sites and pol-
lution hot-spots have been located in poor and minority areas where 
residents do not have the political or economic clout to protest effec-
tively.6 As a result, most U.S. citizens now living on or near environ-
mental toxins belong to low-income and minority groups.7 
 Typically, environmental justice cases address the location of unde-
sirable environmental hazards such as toxic waste sites.8 However, tak-
ing the land of low-income minority groups in order to transfer owner-
ship to private businesses or developers under a public use theory raises 
equally substantive environmental justice issues as does the discrimina-
tory siting of environmental hazards.9 
 Part I of this Note discusses recent cases and scholarship on the 
government’s power of eminent domain. Part II reviews the history of 
the environmental justice movement in the United States and how this 
case law has evolved. Part III compares recent eminent domain cases 
with the framework established by current environmental justice theo-
ries. Finally, Part IV argues that a new standard should be developed 
that will take into account the realities of environmental and land use 
injustice in an effort to equalize the effect of both environmental haz-
ards and takings on different demographic groups. 
I. Eminent Domain: History & Recent Developments 
 The constitutional power to take, or condemn, private land for 
public use has long been recognized as essential to the smooth opera-
tion of both the federal and state governments.10 However, the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides specific limitations on 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 462 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d at 93. 
5 See James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 125, 140–41 (1994); Tseming Yang, 
Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism: Finding Environmental Justice’s Place in Environ-
mental Regulation, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (2002). 
6 See Michele L. Knorr, Environmental Injustice: Inequities Between Empirical Data and Fed-
eral, State Legislative and Judicial Responses, 6 U. Balt. J. Envtl. L. 71, 71–72 (1997); Yang, 
supra note 5, at 5–6. 
7 Colopy, supra note 5, at 130–34; Knorr, supra note 6, at 71; Yang, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
8 See Knorr, supra note 6, at 71–72; Yang, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
9 See Colopy, supra note 5, at 135 (discussing discriminatory impact of siting decisions). 
10 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1875). 
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how and when a seizure of land may occur.11 Specifically, the govern-
ment may only take land for public use, and when land is taken, just 
compensation must be paid to the rightful owner.12 The Fifth Amend-
ment’s due process requirement is another limitation on the govern-
ment’s ability to take land through the power of eminent domain.13 
 As sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities, state and local govern-
ments may use eminent domain, but these seizures are similarly con-
strained by the Fifth Amendment through the application of the Four-
teenth Amendment to state actions.14 Thus, the public use and just 
compensation provisions of the Fifth Amendment are the main con-
straints on the government’s ability to take property from private citi-
zens.15 The due process limitation is less frequently invoked, but is still a 
fundamental constraint on the government’s power.16 
A. The Public Use Limitation to Government Takings 
 The main limit on the government’s ability to take private prop-
erty is that the property must be used for a proper public purpose af-
ter it is taken from its original owner.17 This doctrine has undergone 
expansion and liberalization in meaning since its inception.18 There 
are at least two interpretations of public use: use by the public and use 
for public advantage.19 The latter interpretation is more expansive 
and includes anything that “tends to enlarge resources, increase in-
dustrial energies . . . [and] manifestly contributes to the general wel-
fare and the prosperity of the whole community.”20 Courts have 
moved increasingly away from the former view toward the latter be-
                                                                                                                      
11 See U.S. Const. amend. V. 
12 See id. 
13 See 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 4.3 (Julius Sackman ed., 3d ed. 2005) [here-
inafter 1A Nichols]. 
14 See U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 604, 617 (2001). 
15 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Durham, supra note 2, at 1277–78; 1A Nichols, supra 
note 13, § 4.3. 
16 1A Nichols, supra note 13, § 4.3. 
17 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 521 (Conn. 
2004), aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
18 Kelo, 843 A.2d at 524–25. 
19 Jennifer Maude Klemetsrud, Note, The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Develop-
ment, 75 N.D. L. Rev. 783, 785 (1999). 
20 Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 2002); 2A Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain § 7.02[3] (Julius Sackman ed., 3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter 2A Nichols]; 
Klemetsrud, supra note 19, at 785. 
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cause “use by the public” is too narrow and requires condemned land 
to be used directly by the public.21 
 Under the “use by the public” interpretation, land taken from an 
individual must be used by many and must be common to all.22 This 
interpretation is typically employed by the courts in the absence of leg-
islative intent to the contrary.23 When there is no apparent legislative 
intent, courts are more likely to “sustain the rights of the property 
owner against the public.”24 However, when legislative intent suggests 
using the broader construction of public use, courts have done so.25 
 Some state courts have recently accepted the expanded definition 
of public use: “The test of public use is not how the use is furnished but 
rather the right of the public to receive and enjoy its benefit.”26 Increas-
ingly, various state courts—and even federal courts, including the Su-
preme Court—have allowed government takings that directly benefit 
private interests because they have the potential to benefit the commu-
nity at large via increased economic activities.27 This is not the tradi-
tional narrow view of public use, but it has become the widely accepted 
view, mostly due to broad statutory interpretations of takings laws to 
which the courts give great deference.28 Under the broader view, any 
use that could be perceived to have a public purpose shall be permit-
ted.29 Anything that would tend to increase the economic activities of 
an area or “promote the productive power” of any community is in-
cluded as a public use.30 This has now become the prevailing interpre-
tation of public use.31 
 One of the most cited examples of a court allowing the govern-
ment to take private property and give it to another private interest is 
the infamous case of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.32 In 
                                                                                                                      
21 Kelo, 843 A.2d at 524–25; Klemetsrud, supra note 19, at 785. 
22 See 2A Nichols, supra note 20, § 7.02[2]. 
23 See id. 
24 Id. 
25 See id. § 7.02[2], [3]. 
26 Kelo, 843 A.2d at 525. 
27 Id. at 510; Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 460–
61 (Mich. 1981) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 
91 (N.J. 2002). 
28 See Kelo, 843 A.2d at 555; 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d at 93; 2A Nichols, supra note 20, 
§ 7.02[3]; Klemetsrud, supra note 19, at 786. 
29 2A Nichols, supra note 20, § 7.02[3]. 
30 Id. 
31 See id. 
32 304 N.W.2d 455; see William Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of Emi-
nent Domain: A Constitutional Liberty Under Attack, 4 Pace L. Rev. 231, 231–36 (1983); Ralph 
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this case, the City of Detroit condemned a large tract of land which was 
home to a tight-knit interracial community of lower and middle class 
African-Americans and immigrants, largely from Poland.33 The land 
was condemned in order for the city to provide General Motors with a 
large piece of land on which to build a new factory.34 Without this land, 
General Motors threatened to leave Detroit, taking with it all the jobs 
that go along with operating a large automobile factory.35 At the time, 
Detroit was steeped in an economic crisis and faced higher unemploy-
ment levels than the rest of the country.36 To prevent General Motors 
from leaving, the city offered it a piece of land in politically disenfran-
chised Poletown.37 
 The majority in Poletown determined that the increase in jobs and 
economic development for Detroit was enough to find that there was a 
public use for the land that was given to General Motors.38 The court 
noted that “[t]he power of eminent domain is to be used in this in-
stance primarily to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviat-
ing unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the commu-
nity.”39 The majority even went so far as to say that the benefit derived 
by General Motors through operating this multimillion dollar facility, 
which was subsidized by the city, is “merely incidental” to the public 
purpose of economic development.40 What the majority failed to note, 
however, is that the “public cost of preparing the site agreeable to . . . 
General Motors [was] over $200 million” while General Motors was re-
quired to pay the city only $8 million for the land.41 
 Poletown laid the groundwork for other courts around the country 
to find it acceptable for governments to take private land through emi-
nent domain for the benefit of private enterprises.42 The Poletown court 
                                                                                                                      
Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 207, 217–22 
(2004). 
33 Epstein, supra note 32, at 234; Nader & Hirsch, supra note 32, at 217–18. 
34 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460–61 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); see Nader & Hirsch, supra 
note 32, at 218. 
35 See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). 
36 Id. at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
37 See id. at 467–68 (Ryan, J., dissenting); Epstein, supra note 32, at 234; Nader & 
Hirsch, supra note 32, at 218. 
38 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 459–60. 
39 Id. at 459. 
40 Id.; see Nader & Hirsch, supra note 32, at 219. 
41 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 469 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
42 See Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 88 (N.J. 2002). 
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clearly took the view that anything that would enlarge the resources of 
the community was a public purpose.43 
 Similarly, in Township of West Orange v. 769 Associates, a dispute arose 
over an action by the township to condemn part of 769 Associates’ 
property for use as a road to provide ingress and egress to a third 
party’s housing development.44 769 Associates claimed that this taking 
violated the constitutional requirement that any land taken by eminent 
domain be for the public use.45 The trial court rejected their claim, but 
the appellate division found that the proposed use of the land did vio-
late the public use clause and was thus unconstitutional.46 The appel-
late division decided that the “primary purpose of the proposed right-
of-way . . . is to serve the private interest” of the developer.47 On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the appellate division’s deci-
sion and found that the intended use as a road to a housing develop-
ment satisfied the constitutional requirement that the land be for pub-
lic use.48 The court commented on the expansive definition of public 
use: “Given the broad definition of ‘public use,’ it is not essential that 
the entire community or even any considerable portion of the commu-
nity directly enjoy or participate in the condemned property for the 
taking to constitute a ‘public use.’”49 The ruling implied that even 
when a private party benefits from an eminent domain action, the pub-
lic use requirement is not violated.50 The New Jersey court accepted the 
rationale of the Poletown majority and determined that taking land from 
private citizens for the primary benefit of another private entity fits 
within the purview of the public use clause.51 
 There has been a backlash to these decisions recently, specifically 
in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.52 In this case, a court in Michigan, where 
Poletown was decided, found an eminent domain action unconstitu-
tional because it was not for the public use.53 This case involved an 
eminent domain action by Wayne County against the owners of nine-
                                                                                                                      
43 See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting); 2A Nichols, supra note 20, 
§ 7.02[2], [3]. 
44 800 A.2d at 88. 
45 Id. at 89. 
46 Id. at 89–90. 
47 Id. at 90. 
48 Id. at 88. 
49 Id. at 91. 
50 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d at 91. 
51 See id.; see also Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 
459–60 (Mich. 1981). 
52 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004); 2A Nichols, supra note 20, § 7.02[2]. 
53 See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004) 
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teen parcels of land located near the county’s airport in an economi-
cally distressed area.54 The county determined that it needed these par-
cels, spread out over a thousand-acre tract, for the completion of “Pin-
nacle Project,” a state-of-the-art business and technology park.55 The 
county had already purchased a vast majority of the land and needed 
these last few parcels to complete the project.56 The homeowners 
claimed that the eminent domain action was unconstitutional because 
Pinnacle Project “would not serve a public purpose.”57 
 In this instance, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the 
proposed use was not public in nature, and thus could not be upheld 
under constitutional scrutiny.58 The court noted that although there 
was legislative intent for a broad interpretation of the public use re-
quirement, the court is not required to defer to the legislature on this 
issue.59 The court also noted that a stricter interpretation of the public 
use requirement was necessary to ensure the continued security of pri-
vate property ownership.60 This overturned the previous ruling in Pole-
town and utilized the narrower interpretation of the public use re-
quirement.61 
 Despite this shift in the Michigan Supreme Court’s eminent do-
main jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of the United States held, in 
Kelo v. City of New London, that land could be taken from private citizens 
to create a waterfront hotel and business area consisting primarily of 
private industries.62 This planned business area would also contain new 
homes once the homes of the old owners were removed.63 With this 
decision in the summer of 2005, the Supreme Court accepted the 
broader definition of public use, and recognized that private land may 
be taken for what is not, by traditional definition, a public use.64 
 The definition accepted by the Court allows anything which could 
be deemed to have a “public purpose” to meet the public use require-
ment.65 Allowing land to be taken for a “public purpose” grants much 
                                                                                                                      
54 Id. at 770–71. 
55 Id. at 770. 
56 Id. at 771. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 788. 
59 2A Nichols, supra note 20, § 7.02[2]. 
60 Id. 
61 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 788. 
62 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2659, 2668 (2005). 
63 Id. at 2659. 
64 Id. at 2668. 
65 See id. at 2663. 
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more deference to the local or state government in deciding what con-
stitutes an appropriate use for the land.66 The Supreme Court has 
found that this deference is warranted in eminent domain cases.67 The 
Court also specified that an economic development project satisfied the 
conditions of a public purpose for the land and was thus an acceptable 
result under the public use doctrine.68 
 Economic development projects were deemed acceptable by the 
Court because “promoting economic development is a traditional and 
long accepted function of government.”69 The City of New London 
claimed that the project would lead to the creation of new jobs and in-
creased tax revenue for the city.70 The city hoped to “coordinate a vari-
ety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land with the 
hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum of its parts.”71 
The Supreme Court upheld the statute which authorized the use of 
eminent domain as an appropriate means for achieving the public 
purpose of economic development.72 
B. The Just Compensation and Due Process Limitations to  
Government Takings 
 A further constitutional limitation to the government’s power of 
eminent domain is that for all private land taken by the government, 
the previous owner must be paid just compensation.73 The just com-
pensation limitation requires the government to pay a fair price for the 
land it takes through eminent domain.74 There has been much debate 
on what constitutes fair payment to an owner who does not want to part 
with their property in the first place.75 The consensus is that compensa-
tion for land taken by the government is a natural and absolute right.76 
                                                                                                                      
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665; Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground: Using Emi-
nent Domain for Economic Development, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1837, 1839 (2005). 
69 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 See id. 
73 U.S. Const. amend. V; 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 8.03 (Julius Sackman ed., 
3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter 3 Nichols]. 
74 Nader & Hirsch, supra note 32, at 207. 
75 Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 Envtl. 
L. 1, 2 (1980). 
76 3 Nichols, supra note 73, § 8.03. 
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This right has been viewed both in terms of a natural right and as a 
constitutional right.77 
 An individual has a basic right to remuneration if his land is seized 
by the government in an eminent domain action.78 This right would 
exist even without a specific provision in the U.S. Constitution requir-
ing just compensation.79 Since the eighteenth century, American courts 
recognized a natural right to own and keep property.80 This natural 
right prevents the government from taking property from individuals 
without compensation.81 
 In addition to this natural right guarantee, the Constitution also 
ensures that just compensation will be paid when the government ex-
ercises its eminent domain power.82 It is widely understood that the 
Constitution provides a cause of action for individuals to recover from 
the government if their land has been taken or damaged, and no com-
pensation has been provided.83 These claims are typically referred to as 
inverse condemnation suits.84 The Constitution, however, does not pro-
vide a private right of action when a plaintiff claims that the compensa-
tion paid was not adequate.85 
 Along the same lines, the Constitution imposes two other limita-
tions on exercises of eminent domain: due process and equal protec-
tion.86 The Fifth Amendment states that “no person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”87 This limitation 
was extended and applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.88 The right of the individual not to be deprived of his pri-
vate property is in conflict with the right of the government to take 
land through eminent domain.89 This conflict is resolved by the Due 
Process Clause, placing the burden on the government to satisfy the 
                                                                                                                      
77 Id. § 8.01[1], [2]. 
78 Id. § 8.01[1]. 
79 See id. 
80 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 585 (2d ed. 
2002). 
81 See id. 
82 3 Nichols, supra note 73, § 8.01[2]. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 U.S. Const. amend. V; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 
800 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 2002). 
87 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
88 Id. amend. XIV, § 1; see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). 
89 1A Nichols, supra note 13, § 4.1–4.3. 
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conditions of due process before acting.90 Thus, there is a presumption 
in favor of private property rights, and it is the government’s duty to 
satisfy the requirements of due process before a taking may be consid-
ered legitimate.91 
 Plaintiffs have also attempted to bring claims based on a theory that 
the government has violated their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—as 
well as their right to equal protection under the Constitution—by con-
demning land in a mostly minority neighborhood.92 Section 1983 and 
the Equal Protection Clause ensure that anyone who unlawfully violates 
the rights of any member of society, particularly through discrimination, 
shall be liable to the injured party.93 However, the intent requirement for 
a finding of discrimination has typically prevented this type of claim from 
being successful.94 
 These two constitutional arguments are invoked less frequently 
because of the more specific clause in the Fifth Amendment prohibit-
ing the seizure of private property unless it is for public use and with 
just compensation.95 As long as the acting government entity fulfills 
these constitutional requirements by taking property only for public 
uses, paying just compensation, and not violating due process or equal 
protection, it may take land from private citizens.96 
                                                                                                                      
90 Id. § 4.3. Courts have found that while the government’s right of eminent domain 
and an individual’s right to private property can be diametrically opposed, the Constitu-
tion has resolved this issue in favor of the individual by requiring the government to satisfy 
due process limitations before deprivations of private property will be permitted. Id. 
91 See id. 
92 Case Comment, Civil Rights—Urban Renewal—Allegation of Conspiracy To Use Eminent 
Domain Power for Racially Discriminatory Purpose in Urban Renewal Programs Does Not State a 
Federal Claim Under Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1568, 1568 (1968) 
[hereinafter Case Comment, Civil Rights]; see Green Street Ass’n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th 
Cir. 1967). The court in Green Street Ass’n dismissed the plaintiff’s equal protection claim 
because the plaintiff failed to assert that the taking was not for public use, in addition to 
their equal protection claim. Id. Plaintiffs cannot bring equal protection claims for eco-
nomic discrimination; therefore these claims are typically brought under a theory of racial 
discrimination. Chemerinsky, supra note 80, at 648–49. 
93 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 states: 
Every person, who, under color of any statute, . . . subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
94 See Case Comment, Civil Rights, supra note 92, at 1568–69. 
95 See id. at 1568. 
96 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001); Nader & Hirsch, supra note 
32, at 207–08. 
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C. Purposes of Limiting the Government’s Power of Eminent Domain 
 The reason for limiting the ability of the government to take land 
in particular circumstances, and only when certain conditions are met, 
is to prevent specific groups of individuals from bearing “public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as 
a whole.”97 Requiring that the land taken be for a public use or public 
benefit is an attempt to prevent the government from taking land to 
help its friends or political allies at the expense of its enemies or those 
who do not have the power to protest effectively.98 The just compensa-
tion limitation requires the government to pay for land it takes in an 
effort to make the original owner whole after the government action.99 
While complete compensation for emotional loss is not always possi-
ble—for instance, with the taking of a family home with sentimental 
value—this limitation attempts to prevent gross injustice.100 The just 
compensation requirement ensures that one person or group is not 
responsible for subsidizing a public project.101 
 The due process limitation is in place to protect individuals from 
the arbitrary exercise of government powers.102 Limiting the power of 
the government to take private land also protects the fundamental con-
stitutional right to private property.103 The right of the government to 
take private property is required for the smooth functioning of the 
government.104 However, the value that the Constitution places on pri-
vate property rights requires these limitations on the power of the gov-
ernment to ensure that the government’s eminent domain authority 
does not undermine the constitutional right to own property.105 
 Unfortunately, poor and minority populations still tend to bear the 
burden of eminent domain actions, despite these safeguards.106 Typi-
cally, when the government decides to take private land for redevelop-
ment, the targeted communities have little political influence and are 
                                                                                                                      
97 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)). 
98 See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 32, at 207. 
99 See 3 Nichols, supra note 73, § 8.06. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. § 8.01[2]. 
102 1A Nichols, supra note 13, § 4.4. 
103 See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 32, at 208. 
104 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1875); Nader & Hirsch, supra note 
32, at 207. 
105 See Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371–72; Nader & Hirsch, supra note 32, at 207–08. 
106 See Gallagher, supra note 68, at 1837–38; David M. Herszenhorn, Residents of New 
London Go to Court, Saying Project Puts Profit Before Homes, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2000, at B5. 
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comprised of low-income and minority populations.107 In some cases, 
governments go as far as to remove blighted communities to make way 
for more economically viable redevelopment projects, and this is per-
mitted despite the safeguards of the Constitution.108 
II. Environmental Justice: History & Recent Development 
 Minorities and the poor in the United States are much more likely 
than middle and upper class white populations to be exposed to envi-
ronmental hazards where they live.109 Studies of this phenomenon have 
found that “[t]hree out of every five African-Americans and Latinos live 
in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.”110 Neighborhoods 
that contain hazardous waste incinerators have eighty-nine percent 
more people of color than average neighborhoods.111 Overall, poor 
and minority populations bear the burden of environmental hazards 
within the United States.112 
 Traditionally, the environmental movement was focused on “wil-
derness and species preservation issues, [which] have had little rele-
vance for poor and minority communities” in the United States.113 It 
took longer to bring the effects of environmental racism and environ-
mental injustice into the main stream, but this doctrine has now been 
accepted, and there have been legislative efforts and judicial cases that 
attempt to rectify this injustice.114 The desire to achieve equality in 
bearing environmental hazards has been termed environmental jus-
tice.115 Though originally the environmental justice movement cen-
tered on exposure to toxic waste sites, the doctrine has its parallel in 
the issues surrounding eminent domain. 
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A. Evolution of the Environmental Justice Movement 
 The environmental justice movement is a relatively recent devel-
opment compared to other social justice movements.116 In the 1970s, 
the environmentalist movement sprung out of the success of the civil 
rights movement a decade earlier.117 In the early 1980s, issues associated 
with environmental justice gained attention with the Warren County 
protest.118 
 In 1982, Warren County was chosen by the State of North Carolina 
to house a toxic landfill.119 The landfill was to hold 32,000 cubic yards 
of polychlorinated biphenyl, a highly hazardous chemical.120 Officially, 
Warren County—specifically the town of Afton—was chosen because it 
was a secure site for the toxics.121 Upon closer examination, however, it 
was determined that the site was too close to the nearby water table, 
and thus was not appropriate for a toxic waste site.122 The residents of 
Warren County argued that their county had been chosen not because 
it provided the safest location, but because it was politically disenfran-
chised and thus would not be able to challenge the placement effec-
tively.123 
 Warren County was the poorest county in the State of North Caro-
lina and its population was sixty-five percent African-American.124 The 
situation eventually gained national attention when civil rights groups 
and environmental leaders joined the protest.125 The protest was un-
successful in preventing the placement of the site in Warren County, 
but it did bring national attention to the issues of environmental jus-
tice.126 
 Congressman Walter E. Fauntory, a participant in the protest, 
commissioned the General Accounting Office to do a study to deter-
mine whether there was a relationship between the location of hazard-
ous waste facilities and the racial and economic circumstances of com-
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munities who are chosen to house them.127 The report found that of 
four off-site hazardous waste landfills within the eight-state region of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Region IV—the re-
gion to which Warren County belongs—three were located in pre-
dominantly African-American communities.128 Despite the fact that Af-
rican-Americans only accounted for twenty percent of the population 
of the region, hazardous waste landfills were much more likely to be 
found in African-American communities.129 Similarly, the report found 
that of the people living in areas with hazardous waste landfills, be-
tween twenty-six and forty-six percent were living below the poverty 
line.130 These statistics presented a very strong correlation between 
race, socio-economic status, and the placement of hazardous waste 
landfills.131 
 At the time of this study, some claimed that the sites had not been 
populated by minorities at the time of the siting, but that the place-
ment of a toxic waste facility lowered property values and thus encour-
aged higher proportions of poor and minority people to move into 
those areas.132 Congressman Fauntory’s study found, however, that the 
proportion of African-Americans living at each of the four sites studied 
actually decreased between the time that the facility was placed in the 
area and the time the study was conducted.133 His research defeated the 
so-called “market dynamics” theory, which stated that the communities 
were composed of minorities because the waste facility was located 
there, not that the waste facility was located in the area because the 
community was composed of minorities.134 
 After Fauntory’s study, citizen groups began calling for further in-
vestigation into the phenomenon, and the United Church of Christ un-
dertook a major study in 1987 to determine the relationship between 
race, class, and environmental hazards.135 The results of this study were 
equally staggering: the final report showed that poor people of all races 
were more likely than middle and upper class groups to live near haz-
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ardous waste sites.136 Even more significant, however, is that the study 
found race to be “the single most significant factor associated with the 
location of licensed or abandoned hazardous waste facilities.”137 It also 
determined that the probability that the sites were located so close to 
African-American communities by chance was one in ten thousand.138 
 A 1992 study by the National Law Journal looked at government en-
forcement of environmental laws at Superfund toxic waste sites.139 Ap-
proximately 1200 sites were studied, and the journal concluded that 
penalties incurred for violating environmental laws at sites with the 
greatest white population were 500 times higher than penalties incurred 
at sites with the greatest minority population.140 Similarly, the study 
found that for all laws aimed at protecting citizens from pollution, pen-
alties for violations were forty-six percent higher in white communities 
compared to minority communities.141 Also, a study done in Houston, 
Texas, found that “although African-Americans made up only [twenty-
eight percent] of the Houston population in 1980, six of Houston’s 
eight incinerators . . . and fifteen of seventeen landfills were located in 
predominantly African-American neighborhoods.”142 Thus, not only are 
hazardous waste sites located more frequently in minority neighbor-
hoods, those that are located in predominantly white neighborhoods 
are more strictly regulated to the benefit of nearby populations.143 
 Some commentators have noted that poor and minority communi-
ties are often economically coerced into accepting environmental haz-
ards as a way to make revenue for the community.144 Low-income, mi-
nority neighborhoods have been found to be “more likely to tolerate 
environmental dangers in the hope that the facilities will generate eco-
nomic benefits.”145 When alternative ways of procuring these benefits 
are not available to these communities, they often have no choice but 
to “accept the facilities that no one else wants.”146 When environmental 
hazards are forcibly placed in low-income communities, these commu-
                                                                                                                      
136 Collin, supra note 115, at 133. 
137 Id.; Pinney, supra note 109, at 358. 
138 Collin, supra note 115, at 133. 
139 See Yang, supra note 5, at 6. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Been, supra note 132, at 1395. 
143 See id. at 1399; Collin, supra note 115, at 133; Yang, supra note 5, at 6 (addressing 
the penalties imposed upon nonconforming sites in communities of different racial com-
positions). 
144 See Colopy, supra note 5, at 135. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
288 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:273 
nities are also compelled to sacrifice their own well-being in exchange 
for exiguous economic benefits.147 
 Recently, EPA has tried to rectify this disparity in treatment.148 First, 
EPA formed a working group to determine whether it had been “insensi-
tive to socio-economic concerns affecting both minority and low-income 
neighborhoods.”149 Upon finding that they had been insensitive to these 
concerns, EPA formed the Office of Environmental Equity—now the 
Office of Environmental Justice—in order to “implement environmental 
justice initiatives.”150 Additionally, two environmental justice bills were 
introduced in Congress—although not passed—and President Clinton 
issued Executive Order Number 12,898 stating “each Federal agency 
shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission.”151 
B. Cases Litigated Under an Environmental Justice Theory 
 The history of the environmental justice movement is key to un-
derstanding the issues in some of the seminal environmental justice 
cases.152 In most cases, communities seek to enjoin the placement of a 
waste facility near their neighborhoods using an equal protection the-
ory.153 The plaintiffs, however, usually do not prevail because they lack 
proof of the defendant’s intent to discriminate.154 
 One of the earliest environmental justice cases was Bean v. Southwest-
ern Waste Management Corp.155 This case involved a claim by a predomi-
nantly African-American community against the Southwestern Waste 
Management Corporation contesting the decision of the Texas Depart-
ment of Health to grant a permit to the defendants to locate a Type I 
solid waste facility near their community.156 Specifically, this facility was to 
be located “within 1,700 feet of a predominantly African-American high 
school and only slightly farther from an African-American residential 
neighborhood.”157 
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 The plaintiffs claimed that the location of the facility violated their 
constitutionally guaranteed equal protection rights.158 To prove this 
assertion, the court noted that the plaintiffs “must show not just that 
the decision to grant the permit [allowing the facility] is objectionable 
or even wrong, but that it is attributable to an intent to discriminate on 
the basis of race.”159 The court found that the evidence offered by the 
plaintiffs did not demonstrate an intent to discriminate against them.160 
Thus, the plaintiffs did not meet their burden for securing a prelimi-
nary injunction against the placement of the facility.161 
 To win the injunction, the plaintiffs would have had to demon-
strate that they were substantially likely to succeed on the merits of 
their claim of purposeful discrimination, but the court found such like-
lihood was lacking, 162 The court did note, however, that had it been 
the court’s decision to grant the permit in the first place, it would not 
have done so.163 Similarly, the court expressed sympathy towards the 
plight of the plaintiffs and called the decision to place the facility near 
their school and neighborhood both “unfortunate and insensitive” and 
“insensitive and illogical.”164 Although the court sympathized with the 
plaintiffs, it still found that the plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden 
of proving that the government officials had the requisite discrimina-
tory intent.165 
 A more recent example of an environmental justice case is R.I.S.E., 
Inc. v. Kay.166 This case also involved an equal protection claim by a 
group of plaintiffs who asserted that a county siting decision was dis-
criminatory.167 Since the proposed solid waste landfill would affect both 
whites and African-Americans living in the vicinity of the site, a racially 
heterogeneous community organization brought the case.168 As evi-
dence, the group offered information about three other landfills in the 
area, sited in communities with at least ninety-five percent African-
American populations.169 Once again, the court found that the plain-
                                                                                                                      
158 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677; Colopy, supra note 5, at 147. 
159 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677. 
160 Id. at 680. 
161 Id. 
162 See id. at 681. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 680, 681. 
165 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 680–81; Colopy, supra note 5, at 147–48. 
166 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
167 Id. at 1148; Collin, supra note 115, at 136–37; Colopy, supra note 5, at 148. 
168 R.I.S.E., Inc., 768 F. Supp. at 1145, 1148; Colopy, supra note 5, at 148. 
169 R.I.S.E., Inc., 768 F. Supp. at 1148; Colopy, supra note 5, at 148. 
290 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:273 
tiffs did not meet their burden of establishing that the government of-
ficials had intentionally discriminated against minority groups.170 The 
court held: “[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not impose an af-
firmative duty to equalize the impact of official decisions on different 
racial groups.”171 Rather, the only behavior prohibited by the Equal 
Protection Clause was purposeful discrimination on the basis of race.172 
 The intent requirement has also been a major hindrance to plain-
tiffs in other cases raising environmental justice claims.173 In NAACP v. 
Gorsuch, the court stated that there was “not one shred of evidence that 
race has . . . been a motivating factor” in the siting decision.174 Scholars 
have noted that the intent requirement facilitates implicit racism by 
ensuring that only the most blatant cases of discrimination will be 
found to violate the Equal Protection Clause.175 
 The controlling case on intent to discriminate is Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., which held that dis-
proportionate impact is not sufficient to find discrimination.176 Thus, 
based on this precedent, it is almost impossible for plaintiffs in cases of 
environmental justice to effectively prove discrimination despite clear 
disparate impact.177 
III. The Intersection of Eminent Domain and  
Environmental Justice 
 The issues surrounding cases of environmental injustice are strik-
ingly similar to those surrounding government takings.178 First, resi-
dents in areas targeted for both the siting of environmental hazards 
and for government takings for economic improvement are more likely 
to be low-income and minority.179 Second, the government justifies its 
action in both instances by potential economic improvement for a 
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community.180 Finally, the remedy left open to the victims—judicial in-
tervention—is unsatisfactory because the standard used to review these 
cases makes it impossible for the courts to enforce and protect the 
rights of the victimized population against discrimination.181 
 The similarities between these two types of cases call for the crea-
tion of a new judicial standard which would encompass both envi-
ronmental justice and eminent domain cases.182 It is socially desirable 
to do away with the discriminatory intent standard for environmental 
justice cases and to support a new standard that could be used to ex-
amine the discriminatory effect of both environmental hazard sitings 
and eminent domain actions.183 This new standard would create a re-
buttable presumption of the defendant government’s discriminatory 
intent, and then allow the government to demonstrate that its deci-
sion was not motivated by an intent to discriminate. 
A. Victimization of Low-Income and Minority Populations 
 The homeowners and residents targeted for both takings actions 
and environmental hazard sitings are typically politically isolated, low-
income, and minority groups.184 Local governments choose these 
groups to bear the brunt of these decisions because they “lack the re-
sources and access to political decisionmakers” necessary to defend 
themselves against such decisions.185 In contrast, local governments are 
very unlikely to decide to place a toxic waste facility in the middle of a 
high-income suburb, or to decide to condemn a street of waterfront 
mansions in order to build a hotel and conference center.186 
 Just as environmental hazards are much more likely to be located 
in communities comprised of low-income and/or minority popula-
tions,187 to a slightly less noticeable extent, the same is true of communi-
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ties targeted for governmental takings when the targeted area includes 
personal homes, and the reason for the taking is economic redevelop-
ment.188 Similar to the siting of environmental hazards, when large eco-
nomic redevelopment projects are involved, the land to be used for 
these endeavors is typically found in low-income, politically disenfran-
chised areas.189  However, there are cases where land has been seized 
from private companies for questionable public purposes, but these 
cases typically do not involve large economic development projects.190 
 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit and Kelo v. City of New 
London are demonstrative of the cases where a large group of homes, 
typically comprising an entire neighborhood, is condemned by the gov-
ernment and the land is then given to private developers in hopes of 
future economic benefits for the greater community.191 In these cases, 
minority or low-income neighborhoods were chosen to sacrifice their 
homes for the good of the larger community to which they no longer 
belong.192 These cases parallel the environmental justice cases where 
hazardous facilities are sited in low-income or minority areas in an ef-
fort to prevent effective political opposition.193 
 Typically, low-income and minority groups have less political influ-
ence than wealthier groups.194 This makes them more susceptible to 
undesirable government action, which often comes in the form of siting 
environmental hazards and eminent domain actions.195 The fact that 
similar groups are targeted both in cases of environmental injustice and 
in cases of unfair takings demonstrates that a similar legal framework 
could be established to review governmental decisions in both cases.196 
B. Justification of Public Benefit 
 In many cases, poor neighborhoods are the target of hazardous en-
vironmental sitings and eminent domain actions because it is claimed 
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that these government actions will provide some benefit to the greater 
community.197 Typically, this benefit comes in the form of economic ad-
vantages reaped by the community at large.198 In both cases, the desire 
for economic improvement or development leads government officials 
to sacrifice the health or property rights of the residents most affected 
by the decision.199 
 Although these government decisions have similar results, they are 
often motivated by dissimilar factors.200 Sometimes, local governments 
will decide to site an environmental hazard in its jurisdiction because it 
has few other ways of bringing in revenue.201 In this sense, communities 
may be coerced into accepting environmental hazards because of their 
economic situation.202 Some have argued against allowing payments to 
communities that host landfills and hazardous waste facilities because 
these payment systems “take unfair advantage of the existing unequal 
distribution of wealth.”203 
 When the decision is in the hands of the local government, it is 
able to weigh the options and at least make a choice for the commu-
nity.204 Local governments may agree to site a hazardous facility that no 
one else wants in order to “raise revenue for schools, roads, and other 
public necessities.”205 In a “small, poor, and mostly minority commu-
nity” in Mobile, Alabama, the owners of a local landfill helped the 
community to install air conditioning in the local school and establish 
an educational fund.206 The economic benefits of this siting decision 
were tangible to the community, and even those most affected by prox-
imity to the site were able to reap the benefits in their schools.207 
 On the other hand, there are some cases where the community 
has no voice in the siting decision and the local government makes a 
decision with absolutely no sensitivity to local needs.208 In Bean v. South-
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west Waste Management Corp., the government decided to place a solid 
waste facility, which would presumably bring some benefit to the wider 
community, in a predominantly African-American neighborhood ap-
proximately 1700 feet away from a predominantly African-American 
school.209 Despite the fact that the court itself noted that this decision 
was both “unfortunate and insensitive,” the court ultimately found that 
it must defer to the legislature’s decision because the plaintiffs were 
unable to prove discriminatory intent.210 
 Eminent domain cases are similar: the government makes a deci-
sion about the economic well-being of the community as a whole.211 
However, in these cases the burdened portion of the community is un-
able to reap the benefits of the economic improvement.212 In this in-
stance, the groups most affected by the eminent domain will not have 
the opportunity to benefit from the economic improvements since 
their relocation is a prerequisite for development.213 It is unlikely that 
the citizens of the “ramshackle waterfront neighborhood” of New Lon-
don, “one of Connecticut’s poorest cities,” will have the opportunity to 
benefit from the waterfront hotel, conference center, and eighty new 
homes planned for the area once the current residents vacate.214 
 The desire for economic rejuvenation of depressed areas is a rea-
sonable goal for any local government; however, economic develop-
ment at the expense of the poorest and most vulnerable portions of a 
community is unreasonable.215 When a local government decides to 
host an environmental hazard, their object is to gain the economic 
benefits and resources available to communities of wealthier citizens 
with more political clout.216 Eminent domain actions seek to physically 
destroy the unwanted and economically depressed areas of a commu-
nity and replace them with profitable hotels and factories, despite the 
effects on the local community and local homeowners.217 
 The justification of public benefit works with varying degrees of 
success.218 Both in eminent domain and environmental justice cases, 
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governments claim that the benefits of the project will outweigh the 
costs.219 One of the leaders of the New London development plan re-
portedly announced: “We all need to sacrifice.”220 However, the sacri-
fices demanded by this type of redevelopment plan are inequitable, as 
are the burdens borne by communities who are either forced or co-
erced into accepting environmental hazards for the purposes of eco-
nomic improvement.221 
 Since the government justifies its decisions in both environmental 
siting situations and eminent domain circumstances in similar ways, the 
same judicial standard may be used for reviewing these decisions.222 
The intent of economic improvement is a valid one, but courts should 
not continue to consider it valid when the action has a clearly dispro-
portionate impact on a particular group or groups within the commu-
nity.223 
C. Inadequacy of the Current Judicial Standard 
 Eminent domain cases can fit within the judicial framework estab-
lished by environmental justice cases and be litigated under a similar 
constitutional theory.224 Since these two types of cases have so many 
similarities, it is possible that the victims of eminent domain actions 
could use the theories behind environmental justice cases to more fully 
articulate their legal claims against unjust takings.225 The current legal 
standard of intentional discrimination used in environmental justice 
cases is unsatisfactory, however, and a new standard should be devel-
oped to encompass both environmental justice and eminent domain 
actions.226 
 The residents of Poletown could have made a claim that the deci-
sion to tear down their homes and build a car factory to benefit the 
City of Detroit was discriminatory and violated their Fifth Amendment 
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rights.227 In order to prove this, the plaintiffs would have had to dem-
onstrate that there was a discriminatory result, and that the govern-
ment based its actions on discriminatory intent.228 The plaintiffs would 
not have to prove that discrimination was the only motivating factor, or 
even a primary one,229 but they would have to prove specific intent or 
motivation to discriminate in order to succeed on the merits of their 
claim.230 Proving intent in these circumstances is practically impossible 
in the absence of an incriminating document outlining a discrimina-
tory intent, especially since the government is able to claim economic 
improvement as a presumptively valid intent.231 Evidence of past and 
current disparate impact on low-income or minority groups has not 
been considered sufficient in these cases to prove discrimination.232 
 The African-American residents of King and Queen County tried 
to demonstrate city planners’ discriminatory intent in locating a landfill 
in their primarily African-American community based on evidence of 
previous disparate impact.233 The proposed site was to be in a commu-
nity with an approximately two-thirds African-American population, 
when the population of the county was fifty percent white and fifty per-
cent African-American.234 The plaintiffs proved that one of three other 
landfills in the county was in an area where approximately ninety-five 
percent of the population living in the immediate vicinity of the landfill 
was African-American.235 The other two were in areas where a full one 
hundred percent of the people living within a mile or half-mile radius 
of the sites were African-American.236 Despite this evidence that Afri-
can-American communities in the county were clearly over-burdened 
with their share of landfills, the court found no motive or specific in-
tent to discriminate, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint accord-
ingly.237 
 The residents of areas targeted for condemnation proceedings 
could use these same types of suits to draw greater attention to their 
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plight and to frame the issue as a type of environmental justice.238 The 
similarities between the types of people targeted—and the reasoning 
behind the judicial decisions—in both environmental injustice and 
eminent domain cases make this possible, and would allow for plaintiffs 
to draw attention to their cause even if their suits are unsuccessful.239 
IV. The New Standard: Doing Away with Discriminatory Intent 
 A new standard should be developed for evaluating discriminatory 
governmental actions in environmental justice and eminent domain 
cases.240 Because takings may have a discriminatory effect similar to sit-
ings of environmental hazards, a new standard which fully encompasses 
both of these situations should be considered.241 
 Early on, plaintiffs challenging eminent domain actions under-
taken for the purpose of urban redevelopment attempted—unsuccess-
fully—to use section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act to claim violation of 
equal protection and discrimination based on race.242 Plaintiffs in envi-
ronmental justice cases often invoke section 1983 also, but to similar 
effect.243 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act is the best alternative for 
these cases, and should be open to plaintiffs in both circumstances to 
claim discrimination.244 The standard used to judge violations of this 
section of the Civil Rights Act should similarly be adjusted to allow 
plaintiffs to recover in cases that result in clear discrimination, but 
where it is impossible to prove intent or motive to discriminate.245 
 The pertinent provision of the Civil Rights Act states: 
 Every person who, under color of any statute, . . . subjects, 
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.246 
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Plaintiffs have used this language to claim that the defendant govern-
ments have violated their rights to equal protection in a racially dis-
criminatory fashion, and that they therefore have the right to a civil 
remedy—typically an injunction—against the defendants.247 Histori-
cally, courts have not upheld these claims, in part due to the require-
ment that the plaintiffs prove a motive or intent for discrimination on 
the part of the government officials.248 
 Claims under section 1983 would be better able to address the 
concerns of plaintiffs in eminent domain cases whose homes are taken 
and given to private interests under the auspices of economic redevel-
opment.249 Since courts have recently demonstrated an unwillingness to 
question legislative decisions about what constitutes “public use” of 
taken land, an equal protection claim under the Civil Rights Act could 
give plaintiffs a second weapon in their judicial arsenal for use against 
unjust takings.250 If this tactic were permitted, plaintiffs in eminent 
domain cases could move beyond the fact that courts are permitting 
private land to be taken for mostly private purposes and claim dis-
crimination based on socioeconomic status and race.251 
 Courts have previously decided that these civil rights claims are not 
valid in eminent domain cases.252 Typically, this decision is reached be-
cause plaintiffs have the opportunity to state their claims in condemna-
tion proceedings.253 The decision to prohibit civil rights claims fails to 
take into account the fact that while land might be taken for a stated 
public purpose and with compensation, some of these takings might 
still be blatantly discriminatory.254 Allowing plaintiffs to assert civil 
rights claims in eminent domain cases that result in discrimination ad-
vances the same purposes as allowing plaintiffs in environmental cases 
to bring a civil rights claim.255 
 Permitting plaintiffs in condemnation proceedings to bring civil 
rights claims is not wholly sufficient to ensure that discrimination will 
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not take place.256 A new standard of review for both eminent domain 
and environmental justice cases needs to be developed to ensure that 
discrimination is effectively avoided.257 The controlling case on this sub-
ject, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., held that 
“[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”258 Specifically, the court 
stated that although “[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant . . . it 
is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.”259 This 
decision requires that plaintiffs prove that the government officials op-
erated with an intent or motive to discriminate against the plaintiff in 
order to succeed.260 
 The intent standard, which is still in use, makes it practically im-
possible to prove racial discrimination with the resources available to 
plaintiffs.261 If the goal of the Equal Protection Clause is to prohibit ra-
cial discrimination, a new, less strict standard needs to be applied to 
these cases.262 In the absence of this new standard, cases of obvious dis-
crimination will go unchecked because of the inability of plaintiffs to 
effectively prove discriminatory intent.263 
 In many recent environmental justice cases, equal protection 
claims have not been successful.264 The result in many environmental 
justice cases is inequitable, and the same inequitable outcome would 
likely result in eminent domain actions if plaintiffs had been permitted 
to bring equal protection suits.265 In one environmental justice case, 
the plaintiffs were able to prove that of four landfills placed in a county 
with an equal percentage of white and black residents, all four were 
placed in areas with a majority of African-American residents, and three 
were placed in areas with ninety-five percent or more African-American 
residents.266 Despite this overwhelming finding of disparate impact, the 
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court was forced to conclude that no discrimination existed because of 
the plaintiffs’ inability to prove intent.267 
 In the case of Green Street Ass’n v. Daley, the court found that plain-
tiffs could not even bring an eminent domain case under the Civil 
Rights Act.268 In this case, groups of plaintiffs claimed that the decision 
to take their homes to facilitate an urban renewal project was discrimi-
natory because eighty-five percent of the affected homeowners were 
African-American, and that the reason for the taking was to create an 
African-American-free zone between a new shopping mall and the resi-
dential neighborhood.269 The court found that because the plaintiffs 
did not claim that discrimination was the sole purpose of the decision 
to take their homes, a lawsuit based on a discrimination theory could 
not be permitted.270 Although the plaintiffs claimed that the “actual 
purpose” of the action was discriminatory, their discrimination suit was 
thrown out in the absence of proof of intent and “sole purpose.”271 
 These two cases are indicative of cases in which there is an obvious 
disparate impact on minority and low-income communities.272 How-
ever, up to this point, courts have been unwilling to find evidence of 
disparate impact sufficient to prove discrimination.273 The courts 
should begin to allow evidence of disparate impact to prove discrimina-
tion in these cases.274 If disparate impact evidence were permitted to 
conclusively demonstrate discrimination, the evil that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Civil Rights Act aim to prevent would be much more 
effectively limited.275 According to the court in Arlington Heights, the 
Equal Protection Clause is focused on eliminating “invidious discrimi-
nation.”276 Invidious racism and discrimination, however, cannot be 
eliminated when the current judicial standard makes it impossible for 
plaintiffs to prove discrimination.277 
 The court also notes in Arlington Heights that the judiciary must be 
deferential to the legislature in its decision to condemn homes—and 
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presumably to site toxic waste facilities in communities—unless the 
plaintiffs can show discriminatory purpose.278 If plaintiffs are unable to 
show discriminatory purpose, the courts must defer to the stated intent 
of the legislature.279 This presents plaintiffs with a composite and diffi-
cult problem as it is almost impossible for plaintiffs to prove the requi-
site intent; in the absence of their ability to do so, the courts are re-
quired to defer to the stated intent of the legislature.280 This essentially 
gives the government free reign to state a purpose of public benefit for 
any project that has discriminatory intent or impact.281 Plaintiffs are 
then unable to prove otherwise because of their virtually insurmount-
able burden of proof.282 
 Nonetheless, intent is clearly an important aspect of any govern-
mental decision. However, if plaintiffs are able to demonstrate a signifi-
cant disparate impact, the government should then be required to 
prove that its intent was specifically non-discriminatory.283 This type of 
“burden-shifting” mechanism has been used in cases where it has been 
determined that the burden of proof on plaintiffs is too high.284 Prov-
ing intent to discriminate in environmental justice and eminent do-
main cases places too high a burden on the plaintiff, and if the plaintiff 
can demonstrate significant disparate impact, then the court must shift 
the burden to the defendant and allow it the opportunity to prove it 
had only legitimate, non-discriminatory intent.285 Insulating the gov-
ernment from judicial scrutiny by making it impossible to prove dis-
crimination sacrifices the rights of some for the benefit of others.286 
This was not the intention of the Equal Protection Clause or the Civil 
Rights Act.287 
Conclusion 
 Eminent domain actions involving the transfer of property from 
private citizens to other private interests under the auspices of eco-
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nomic growth or development raise the same discrimination concerns 
as environmental justice cases. Both takings and environmental justice 
cases often involve targeted groups of low-income minority citizens who 
bear the brunt of the government’s desire to stimulate economic activ-
ity at any cost. These groups are left without an appropriate judicial 
remedy because of the requirement that plaintiff groups prove that lo-
cal government officials acted with an intent to discriminate. 
 Since it is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to meet this high stan-
dard, governments are not held accountable for the disparate impact 
their actions have on low-income and minority groups. Although our 
nation has come far in its fight against racism, if governments are al-
lowed to continue to disproportionately burden minority groups with 
unjust land use decisions, neither economic, political nor social equal-
ity will ever be realized. The courts need to adopt a new standard for 
judging these cases. Courts should look not only at the intent of the 
government officials, but also at the historical impact of similar gov-
ernmental decisions in the same area, and how those decisions have 
affected the group, or groups, in question. Once these issues are taken 
into account by the courts, it will be much more likely that minority 
communities will enjoy the protections guaranteed to them by the Con-
stitution. 
